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• Large infrastructure 
• Large dollar investments
• Fully owned by the 
Government or 
commercial companies
• Long timelines 
• Space is 
different/harder/special
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How the Larger Community Typically Things of Space
Large Strategic Investments
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How We Should Think Of Space
• We should view satellites as part of a 
network
• Satellites may be trunk lines
• They may be significant nodes
• They may be minor nodes
• Every domain has it’s own challenges
• Every problem/challenge should pull 
from as many domains as possible
• Space should represent all players
• We should understand the confidence 
from each source 
The Internet network: nodes are computers or post-pc devices 
and links are wired or wireless connections between them
The Need for Higher Throughput 
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How do we get from 
here to there?
WHY DOES MISSION ASSURANCE EXIST?
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Mission scope fits into capabilities 
and complexity available given 
technical, programmatic and 
oversight needs
Mission scope is static and 
resources applied to achieve that 
mission
SmallSat Mission Assurance Realities
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Build your own boxFit within the “box” given to you
REQUIREMENTS
DRIVEN
CONSTRAINT
DRIVEN
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. This 
approach is proposed and has not been approved by the Air Force.
SmallSat Mission Assurance Realities
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1. Constraint-driven missions are the most common
2. Class D mission assurance practices are significantly modified or ignored
3. Class D overhead can dilute the full potential contribution of small 
satellites 
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What are the minimum 
practices I should use to 
meet constraint-driven 
goals?
Percentage of Spacecraft Success
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94% - “BIG SPACE” CUBESATS / ALL LVS ‘07-’17
87% - PICO/NANOSATS THAT COMMUNICATE, ~2017 85% - CUBESAT INDUSTRY NOT DOA
78% - CUBESATS THAT COMMUNICATE, 2000-2016
63% - HOBBYIST CUBESATS NOT DOA
How can I push the boundary 
of faster innovation while 
still achieving an acceptable 
Return-on-Investment?
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At inception, the stakeholders and designers should have an honest conversation about 
whether the mission is requirements or constraint driven
Elements of constraint driven MA
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Mission 
Assurance
Requirements 
Driven
Traditional Class 
A – D Practices
Constraint 
Driven
Technical 
Implementation
Approval 
Authority
Programmatic 
Constraints
Drives MA higher 
or lower pending 
risk areas
Cost & schedule 
often drive MA 
lower
More thorough 
review often drives 
MA higher
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Class Example Technical Activities Programmatic
A
Extremely Critical, Operational - Missions are extremely critical operational systems where all practical measures are 
taken to ensure mission success. They have the highest cost, are of high complexity, and the longest mission life with 
tight launch constraints.
Fully requirement driven; cost/schedule allow 
confirmation of full mission success with absolute 
minimal residual risks
B
Critical, Operational or Demo Op – Missions are defined as critical operational, exploration, and technical 
demonstrators in which only minor compromises are taken in stringent processes for mission success to achieve a low 
risk profile. The criteria for minor compromises include allowing controlled single point failures, proto-flight hardware, 
Level/Grade 2 EEE parts, reduced circuit analysis, etc.
Fully requirement driven; cost/schedule allow 
confirmation of full mission success with few residual 
risks
C Less Critical, Exploratory or Experimental – Missions are defined as lower national significance, exploratory or experimental missions, with a reduced set of MA standards applied resulting in a moderate risk profile.
Fully requirement driven; cost/schedule allow 
confirmation of full mission success with moderate 
residual risks
D
Experimental (Full Requirements Driven) - All of the below, plus:
• Full functional and performance testing
• Worst Case Analyses & design
• NPR 8705.4, TOR-2011(8591)-21
Fully requirement driven; cost/schedule allow 
confirmation of full mission success but with higher 
residual risks
E
Full (Constrained) Mission Success - All of the below, plus:
• Environmental characterization and flow into requirements (i.e. radiation)
• Full functional and limited performance testing
• More detailed FTA & FMEA (flight, ground, GSE), SPF analysis/redundancy
• Requirement development to at least L2 and V&V
Less capability constrained and more requirement driven; 
cost/schedule allow confirmation of capability to achieve 
full mission success
F Minimum Mission Success – Add full command testing, DITL, common mission-modes, items to address mission-specificrisks, thermal analysis
Mostly capability constrained; cost/schedule allow 
confirmation of capability to achieve minimum mission 
success
G Survival – Add critical survival testing (power, comm. for tumble cases, charge/discharge, TVAC)
Mostly capability constrained; cost/schedule doesn’t 
allow significant confirmation of capability beyond 
survival
H Do no harm – Range safety, do-no-harm environments, de-orbit compliance Fully capability constrained; bare minimum cost/schedule
Technical Implementation Taxonomy
Technical implementation taxonomy
Demonstrated Level of Capability Implication
Do No Harm DOA is ok (education and/or fully 
constrained and not requirement 
driven)
Survival Not DOA (power + low-rate comm). 
May have no higher level functionality
Minimum Functionality Min. Mission Success. Mission 
Recoverable in event of fault:
Ex: LEOPS/start up
Ex: Maintain Formation
Nominal (payload performance driven 
by constraints)
Full Mission Success. Full 
Functionality
Nominal (payload performance driven 
by requirements)
Full Mission Success. Full 
Functionality
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All missions are designed for full mission success; the amount of mission 
assurance can provide a level of confidence in mission success
Demonstrated 
Level of Capability
Example Technical Activities Example Approval 
Authority (AA)/Oversight
Programmatic
Do No Harm Vibration testing, bake out, inhibit design review/test, range 
safety measures demonstrated, no RF transmission within 45 
minutes of deployment/no attitude maneuvers within 15 
minutes, 25 year deorbit. 
AA: Program
Reviews: informal peer, 
launch readiness. 
Fully constrained, schedule + cost allow
launch requirement verification only
Survival (All of the above), possibly designing power/comm for 
tumble, long range communications testing with ground 
station has been completed(1), complete charge/discharge 
cycle testing completed(2), TVAC. 
AA: Program
Reviews: informal peer, may 
have stakeholder. 
Mostly constrained, schedule + cost do not 
allow significant confirmation of capability
beyond survival
Minimum 
Functionality
(All of the above), full command execution test(3), 
startup/POR DitL testing(4), Sun-point test(5), other mission 
specific tests demonstrating survival functionality, mission 
specific FTA & Self-EMC test, thermal analysis. 
AA: Program +1 level
Stakeholder input
Reviews: informal-SCR, 
PDR, CDR, TRR, LRR
Mostly constrained, schedule + cost allow 
confirmation of capability to achieve 
minimum success
Nominal 
(constraints)
(All of the above), environmental characterization and flow 
down into requirements (i.e. radiation), full functional and 
limited performance testing, more detailed FTA & FMEA 
(flight, ground, GSE), SPF analysis/redundancy, requirement 
development to at least L2 and V&V. 
AA: Program +2 levels
Stakeholder input/vote
Reviews: formal-SCR, PDR, 
CDR, TRR, LRR.
Less constrained and more requirement 
driven, schedule + cost allow confirmation 
of capability to achieve full success
Nominal 
(requirements)
(All of the above), full functional and performance testing, 
Worst Case Analyses & design. NPR 8705.4, TOR-
2011(8591)-21
AA: Director
Stakeholder vote/driven
Fully requirement driven, schedule + cost 
allow confirmation of capability to achieve 
full success
Technical implementation taxonomy
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Programmatic Implementation Example
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Programmatic Cat 3 Missions
-Historical Class A-D
-Above a certain Max $ value
-Well Understood
Programmatic Cat 2 Missions
-Embraces New Space parts and 
practices
-Above a certain moderate $ value
-Medium Risk
Programmatic 1 Missions
-Embrace terrestrial systems 
embedded systems practices
-Most affordable $ value
-High Risk
Conclusions
• New mission assurance profiles are needed that represent constraint 
driven mission sets
• Oftentimes we trade science and technology requirements for 
schedule or cost safings
• A clear scope and broad understanding of constraints drive 
implemented MA to have the greatest ROI
• Generally more constrained missions allow decisions in all areas to be 
made closer to the project implementers (drive decision authority as 
low as possible)
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Is this the right path? We want to engage with the community!
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Case study: Competing objectives/constraints
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University Desired Approach: SURVIVAL
Professor believes 
educational intent met if 
some communication with 
satellite is achieved
Work must primarily be 
done by students (mostly 
new team, 2nd sat of 
university)
 Having the same students 
go through the entire 
process provides the best 
educational experience 
(~80% turnover in 2 years)
 Need additional program 
funding
Company X Desired Approach: FULL SUCCESS
Company X wants to show 
their product works as 
expected on-orbit
Only has internal funding 
to support spacecraft 
development activities 
related to their payload
 No flight heritage of this 
product, paying customers 
not ready to assume risk
Product is batch produced 
and as a result, several flight 
models are available
Launch Provider Y 
Expectation: DO NO HARM
Launch Provider Y is 
primarily concerned with 
safety of their launch vehicle 
on its first flight
Schedule is 100% driven 
by the launch provider since 
they are financing this first 
flight.
 Safety to the flight vehicle 
is non-negotiable
MISSION ASSURANCE RESULT:
SURVIVAL
Team/Stakeholder Discussion:
• University/Company X need teaming 
opportunities to achieve goals, both 
benefit from launch provider involvement
• Time is key driver- launch provider will not 
provide schedule flexibility & value to 
individual students decreases as 
development extends beyond their 
academic term
• Knowing that inexperienced personnel 
would be performing most of the 
spacecraft development work, Company X 
recognized it could mitigate some risk by 
flying with several university teams who 
have programs operating on similar 
timelines
SCENARIO: Multi-organization teaming
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Expectation: DO NO HARM
Launch Provider Y is 
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safety of their launch vehicle 
on its first flight
Schedule is 100% driven 
by the launch provider since 
they are financing this first 
flight.
 Safety to the flight vehicle 
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MISSION ASSURANCE RESULT:
SURVIVAL
Practical Implementation:
• All Do no harm/Survival testing
• DitL testing and full command execution 
test only if time permits
• Internal university reviews and approval, 
Company X supports all, but does not 
pass/fail, launch provider attends from 
CDR on, has final say in LRR
SCENARIO: Multi-organization teaming
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Case Study: Multi-Level Mission Assurance
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Scenario: Company X plans to field a constellation of satellites
Phase 1: One satellite for proof-of-
concept demo, use lessons 
learned in Phase 2
Phase 2: Field full constellation
Key Driver: Time – want to be first 
to market, investor ROI
Discussion
Investors & developers agree 
imperfect functionality in Phase 1 
demo is acceptable as long as path 
forward exists by Phase 2
Testing the full set of satellites 
may be time intensive, especially if 
high-confidence in performance is 
needed before launch
Mission Assurance Result:
MIXED
Phase 1: SURVIVAL
• Company X chooses lower MA 
approach to realize near-term 
results and maintain momentum
Phase 2: NOMINAL for a few/ 
MINIMUM SUCCESS for most
• One vehicle per batch undergoes 
rigorous testing for systematic 
failures, remainder undergo 
minimal assurance
• Phasing of production & launch 
staggered to allow 
improvements; (i.e. Full Mission 
Success assurance through on-
orbit testing/demo instead of 
purely ground assurance 
practices
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